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MAKING YOUTH VIOLENCE VISIBLE:
THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE SUMMER OF VIOLENCE
PAUL COLOMY AND LAURA ROSS GREINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, youth violence has become a prominent issue on the
public agenda. The president and congressional representatives alike
have proposed legislation targeting juvenile crime. Across the country,
states have made it easier to charge and try juveniles as adults. They have
underwritten the construction of no-nonsense, youth prisons while man-
dating that juvenile courts consider public safety as well as the child's
best interests. At the local level, schools have instituted zero-tolerance
policies, with seemingly minor (or unintended) infractions of the new
rules resulting in immediate suspension or expulsion. For many social
scientists, public intellectuals, and policymakers, the impetus for these
initiatives is painfully obvious: an unprecedented rise in serious youth
crime has propelled this issue into the public spotlight. As Barry Field
notes, "the backdrop for public concerns about youth crime" is the "rapid
escalation in juvenile violence in the mid-1980s, arrests of increasingly
younger juveniles for violence, and especially the dramatic rise in homi-
cide arrests [of juveniles]."'
An increase in serious juvenile offenses is indeed a crucial back-
drop, but it alone cannot account for the heightened visibility of this
problem. We maintain that the news media have played a critical role in
making youth violence a salient public issue. They have not done so by
merely broadcasting numeric data on crime reported to police, arrest
figures, or the results of victimization surveys; rather, the press has
brought attention to this issue by offering continuous and prominent cov-
erage of purported epidemics of youth violence, selectively focusing on
highly unusual incidents, and providing (melo)dramatic accounts of these
atypical cases. Among other things, this pattern of reporting has "democ-
ratized the risk" associated with youth violence, suggesting that anyone
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in American society--regardless of class rank, moral standing, or demo-
graphic profile-is a potential victim.
We substantiate this argument through a case study of the "Summer
of Violence," which occurred in Denver and Colorado during the sum-
mer months of 1993. 3 In response to an apparent upsurge of street crime,
Governor Roy Romer convened a special session of the state legislature
to address the problem of youth violence.4 At the conclusion of this spe-
cial session, Romer signed into law a spate of bills aimed at controlling
what was then perceived as an unprecedented outbreak of serious juve-
nile crime. These measures included what a local newspaper heralded as
a "landmark gun control bill.",6 Another measure established the Youthful
Offender System ("YOS"), a new tier in the correctional apparatus de-
signed to house 480 serious juvenile offenders.7 Both bills signaled Colo-
rado's commitment to a decidedly tougher stance against violent juve-
niles.' As Governor Romer explained during a bill signing ceremony,
"This state is going to be very tough and very disciplined about these
youthful offenders who are professional, tough, repeated [sic], violent,
organized criminals."9
Though the Centennial State was hardly alone in getting tough on
transgressing adolescents, 0 these measures were far from an artless re-
sponse to a plainly evident social problem or the inevitable product of an
irresistible isomorphism. In fact, the juvenile gun control and YOS bills
were, when initially proposed, regarded as dubious propositions." Dur-
ing its regular session, which concluded in mid-May 1993, the state leg-
2. JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 29-31 (1990).
3. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al
4. See Jennifer Bavin & Steve Lipsher, Gun Bill Passes as Session Closes, DENV. POST,
Sept. 12, 1993, at Al.
5. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
6. See Jennifer Bavin & Steve Lipsher, Gun Bill Passes as Session Closes, DENV. POST,
Sept. 12, 1993, at Al.
7. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
8. Id.
9. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
10. See generally PATRICIA TORBET, ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR JUVINILE
JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME XV (1996)
(discussing the fact that from 1992 to 1995, forty-eight of fifty-one state legislatures (including the
District of Columbia) enacted laws targeting serious juvenile offenders. In all but ten states these
statutes make it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult, criminal courts; in twenty-five states, new
legislation gives judges additional sentencing options to incarcerate young lawbreakers for longer
periods of time; and in twenty-three states new laws created alternative and invariably more punitive
correctional programs for juveniles).
11. See Session in Brief: What Passed and What Died, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at A1.
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islature had rejected bills that closely resembled, or were moderate ver-
sions of, these two measures.'" Writing in early August, shortly after the
special session had been announced, but a month before it opened, and
distressed by the likelihood of a fruitless legislative repeat performance,
a reporter predicted that, "Lawmakers will have a sense of deja vu, al-
ready having considered-and killed-many of the issues expected to
come before them again in the special session." The Colorado Assem-
bly had, for example, repudiated a "half-dozen gun control bills," 4 in-
cluding a measure virtually identical to the "landmark gun control bill"
passed four months later in the special session." The prospects for not
merely adding prison cells, but authorizing an entirely new tier in the
correctional system, appeared even more dismal. 6 In the regular session,
the legislature had rebuffed a provision that would have asked voters to
consider a one-quarter cent increase in the state's sales tax to generate
additional revenue for prison construction." Another proposal recom-
mended expanding "the seriously overcrowded Colorado Division of
Youth Services." 8 However, while lawmakers approved the plan, they
refused to fund it, thereby, rendering the legislation an empty gesture. 19
Ironically, a cost-cutting statute approved in the regular session reduced
sentences for some crimes in order to slow the growth of prisons. 2 The
governor, however, was not dissuaded by the seemingly long odds. Intu-
iting a fateful change, he sensed that similar, and even more costly and
controversial, renditions of measures rejected in May were "'more likely
to pass' in September.2 "'There is a different atmosphere now than there
was in the spring when the session was here,"' the governor assured the
worried journalist, and in this altered environment there was "'a much
more radical need for action.'
2
The governor was right. Between May and August, 1993, a signifi-
cant transformation had occurred, and there was mounting pressure on
local and state officials to "do something" about street violence.* The
news media played a crucial role in this transformation. From May 2,
12. Id.
13. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
14. See Session in Brief: What Passed and What Died, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Proposal to Raise State Sales Tax for Prisons Shot Down, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS,
May 7, 1993, at A20.
18. See, Dick Foster, Lesgisators Block Juvenile Proposal, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS, May 31,
1993, at A 10.
19. See Dick Foster, Lesgislators Block Juvenile Proposal, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS, May 3 1,
1993, at A8.
20. See John Sanko, A Look at the Results of the 1993 Legislative Session, ROCKY MNTN.
NEWS, May 16, 1993, at A28.
21. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summerof Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
22. ld
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when a baby at the Denver Zoo was struck by a stray bullet23, to August
2, when an elementary school teacher was murdered in a suburban park-
ing lot 4, print and electronic media gave extensive coverage to several
"high profile," violent crimes, a number of which were allegedly com-S • 25
mitted by gang-affiliated juveniles. These incidents becane the center-
piece of an unfolding media event, eventually dubbed "The Summer of
Violence" by the local press, that continued until mid-September when
26lawmakers concluded their deliberations. The unremitting coverage of
this putative crime wave heightened fear of violence, prompting some
residents to flee the supposedly deadly environs of Denver for the allur-
ing (but ultimately elusive) safety of the suburbs. 7 Others organized
marches to "take back the streets" or badgered public officials to "crack
down" on violent youth. This was the "different atmosphere" in which
the governor divined "a much more radical need for action" and con-
vened the special session.
We use content analysis and a qualitative assessment of the print
media's coverage of the "Summer of Violence" to elucidate a crucial
feature of the proximate environment of action in which the call for a
special session was issued. Preceding that analysis and assessment, a
brief theoretical discussion argues that the contemporary media some-
time function, in effect, as a primary claimant group, casting a powerful
spotlight on ostensibly troublesome social conditions. The media's glare
is not, however, always successful in catapulting purportedly problematic
conditions to the forefront of the public agenda. Consequently, we also
examine how the responses of citizens, opinion leaders, and policymak-
ers lent additional credence to media claims about an apparent surge in
youth violence.
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND
THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Social constructionist theory, the analytic framework adopted here,
disputes the presumption that social problems are objective conditions
whose "intrinsically harmful or malignant nature, 28 necessarily com-
mands a forceful societal response. This common-sense view is belied by
the prevalence of objectively harmful conditions-e.g., gender inequal-
ity, child abuse, and poverty-that have existed for centuries without
being ratified as social problems. It is more accurate, constructionists
contend, to portray social problems as the result of a process of collective
23. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, A16.
24. Id
25. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Herbert Blumer, Social Problems as Collective Behavior, 18 SOC. PROBLEMS 298 (1971).
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definition "in which a given condition is picked out and identified' '29 as
undesirable.
No invisible hand operates in the social problems marketplace 0 to
insure that arrangements and practices posing the greatest threat to the
community or society are pushed to the top of the policy agenda. Instead,
a condition's visibility often reflects the efforts of concerned citizens,
reformers, and/or entrenched interest groups to draw attention to a par-
ticular issue. Highlighting the crucial role mobilized citizens and groups
play in determining "which condition is picked out and identified"'" as a
pressing public issue, sociologists have dubbed these activists "claims-
makers," "claimants," or "social problems entrepreneurs. 3 2 Any single
claimant group must compete for the attention of policymakers and the
public with a large number of other claimsmakers equally adamant about
the pernicious character of a wide variety of different conditions. In this
highly competitive marketplace, an advantage accrues to claimants who
attract the news media to their cause.33 Media coverage often awakens
public concern and lends credibility and legitimacy to claimants' griev-
ances, brings resources and recruits to the claimant group, and pressures•. 34
policymakers to respond to problematic conditions. The media have a
"finite carrying capacity," however, and cannot provide the publicity
sought by all claimants. In the fierce competition for media attention,
resource-rich, social problems entrepreneurs often hire professionals with
expertise in packaging claims for the press,36 while resource-poor claim-
ants are compelled to rely on rhetorical tropes (e.g., atrocity tales,37 sci-
entific evidence, 3' and moral outrage 3 ) or well-orchestrated protests-toelicit media interest.
29. Seeld.at301.
30. Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public
Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. OF SOC. 53-78 (1998).
31. See Blumer, supra note 28, at 301.
32. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, Social Problems: A Re-formulation 21 SOC. PROBLEMS
149 (1973); see also MALCOLM SPECTOR AND JOHN KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 23-31 (1977) (discussing the fundamental tenets of social constructionist theory).
33. JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 14-15 (1990).
34. Id. at 14.
35. See Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A
Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. SOC. at 67.
36. See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 29-30 (1990); see also John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements, 82 AM.J. OF SOC. 1212-1241 (1977) (discussing strategies
employed by professional social movement activists for mobilizing a variety of resources, including
news media coverage).
37. See BEST, supra note 2, at 28-29.
38. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-
DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER 27-28 (1981).
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The logic of this argument suggests that the construction of .many
social problems depends on a "division of definitional labor."4  The
work begins with "primary claimsmakers, who air grievances about a
variety of conditions in a social problems marketplace. The media then
sift and sort through these competing claims, identifying a small subset
meriting coverage. The media do not simply "repeat primary claims and
transmit them to a larger audience," ' however. These initial claims are
refracted across "the conventions and constraints , inhering in media
organizations, a process that "transforms and translates" 44 the original
grievances into news. In the construction of social problems, therefore,
the media frequently function as a "secondary claimsmaker. 45
Though this division of labor is readily apparent in the construction
of many social problems, there are important instances where the media
46act, in effect, as a primary claimant. Few other claimsmakers can match
the press's ability (or its resources) to define a condition as a matter "war-
ranting public concern ' 47 and official action. Consequently, when acting
as a primary claimant, news agencies play "a crucial role in formulating
public issues and events.4a John Johnson,49 for example, contends that
media-relayed "horror stories"5° about the maltreatment of children "set
the stage for making a public issue of child abuse, '"" while Gladys Engel
Lang and Kurt Lang characterize the press as "a prime mover '5 2 in the
initial expose of the Watergate burglary and attempted cover-ups that,
39. Joseph Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 SOC. PROB
209-229.
40. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF 9 (1959).
41. See BEST, supra note 2, at 87.




46. See, e.g., Joel Best, "Road Warriors" on "Hair-Trigger Highways:" Cultural Resources
and the Media's Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 327-345
(1991); Mark Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, 25 SOC. PROBLEMS 531-543 (1978); Kathleen
S. Lowney and Joel Best, Stalking Strangers and Loves: Changing Media Typifications of a New
Crime, in IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 33-57
(Joel Best ed., 2d ed. 1995).
47. See BEST, supra note 2, at 108.
48. See Fishman, supra note 46, at 542.
49. See John Johnson, Media Manslaughter, in 9 STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
201-208 (1988); see also John Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of Child Abuse, in
TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 17-31 (Joel Best, ed., 2d ed. 1995).
50. Johnson, Media Manslaughter, supra note 21, at 207.
51. ld
52. GLADYS E. LANG & KURT LANG, THE BA'ITLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION: THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESS AND THE POLLS DURING WATERGATE 302 (1983).
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subsequently, became critical elements in a highly-charged, symbolic
crisis about democratic governance."
III. METHODS AND DATA
Our investigation of the news media's claimsmaking activity in
Denver's (and Colorado's) (1993) summer of violence relies on several
sources of data. We use quantitative content analysis to estimate the sali-
ence of juvenile crime coverage, counting the number of youth and vio-
lent crime stories54 published in the Denver Post" ("Post") during the
summer months (June, July, and August) of 1992, 1993, and 1994. This
coverage is also evaluated in terms of the placement and length of youth
crime articles and the number, placement, and size of photographs ac-
companying these articles.16 This content analysis-presented in the fol-
lowing section-discloses a dramatic surge in the Post's coverage of
juvenile and violent crime during the summer of 1993. To determine
whether the increased coverage simply reflected a corresponding rise in
the incidence of serious crime, we consulted the official monthly reports
of the metro area's two largest police departments (Denver and Aurora)
that are forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and summa-
rized in its annually published Crime in the United States: The Uniform
Crime Report. These monthly reports were used to calculate the amount
of violent crime and the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses in
these two cities during the summer months of 1992, 1993, and 1994.
The meanings conveyed by the print media's coverage were identi-
fied through a qualitative assessment of recurring themes. This involved
inspecting all youth and violent crime and "summer of violence" stories
printed during the summer months57 oi 1993 in the Post and the Rocky
53. Id.
54. Youth and violent crime articles were identified through the Denver Post Index using
several topical categories: crime, crime prevention, criminal law, criminal sentences, detention
centers, gangs, juvenile delinquency, murder and murder attempts, victims of crime, violent crime,
and violence. Every story in the category of juvenile delinquency was included in the sample. For
the category "gangs," every story was included with the exception of articles describing adult,
mobster gangs. Stories for all other categories were included only if the Index indicated that the
article contained one or more of the following phrases: youth/juvenile violence; youth/juvenile
offender; epidemic of violence; crime wave; town meetings/marches/protests/press
conferences/church sermons on crime/violence; correctional facilities for youth; criminal/juvenile
system and youth; gangs; gang prevention; random violence; reports on
pattems/distributions/trends/rates of crime/violence; fear of crime/violence; and
funds/resources/personnel allocated to crime/violence prevention programs.
55. We selected the Denver Post because it had (in 1993 and today) the largest circulation of
any newspaper in the state.
56. We focus on youth and violent crime because this topic, more so than any other, fueled
local media coverage of the summer of violence.
57. This analysis revealed that the summer of violence, as portrayed by the local media,
actually commenced on May 2, 1993, when an infant visiting the Denver Zoo was struck by a stray
bullet. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, 16A.
Consequently, our exploration of news themes begins with the "zoo shooting" in early May and
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Mountain News ("News")-both mainstream, highly competitive, daily
newspapers published in the Denver metro area and circulated through-
out the state-and probing these reports for their manifest content and
latent symbolic codes.58 Interviews with 23 reporters, columnists, and
editors 9 involved in writing about youth crime for the two papers during
the 1993 summer supplemented the qualitative assessment of news
themes. While recognizing that media accounts are polysemic and sub-
ject to divergent interpretations by various audiences, we designed these
interviews to elicit the "preferred meaning[s] and point[s] of view" re-
porters were "inviting" their readers to accept.6° The interviews were
semi-structured and organized around two dozen, open-ended questions
we had prepared before meeting with reporters. We often asked respon-
dents for clarification and elaboration, and consequently most interviews
had a conversational quality, requiring from twenty minutes to two hours-
to complete. We also interviewed three local television reporters, a local
talk-radio show host, and a reporter employed by Westword, an alterna-
61tive Denver newspaper.
IV. CONTINUOUS AND PROMINENT COVERAGE OF YOUTH AND VIOLENT
CRIME
Newspapers are divided into sections and pages, and placing a story
on a specific page and section-like the decisions about a story's appro-
priate length and whether it should be accompanied by a photograph-
reflects a professional judgement about the story's newsworthiness. And
since journalists place a premium on novelty, frequent reports about the
same issue-particularly when they appear on the paper's front pages
and its editorial section-also signal an assessment about the issue's sig-
nificance. When the press plays, in effect, an initiating role in identifying
a pressing public problem it typically does so by devoting continuous
concludes with the closing ceremonies of the Colorado General Assembly's Special Session on
Youth Violence in mid-September, 1993. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth
Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS, Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
58. We also acquired footage of a local television station's coverage of several violent crimes
featured in both print and electronic media reports during the summer of violence. Our discussion of
news themes occasionally draws on this televised coverage.
59. Though we interviewed reporters, columnists, and editors, we will subsequently
characterize all respondents generically as either journalists or reporters. We do this to protect the
confidentiality we promised those who spoke to us. Similar concerns preclude using gender, age,
race, or ethnicity to describe particular reporters.
60. William A. Gamson, ET AL., Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality, 18
ANN. REV. SOC. 388 (1992).
61. For a related project, we conducted interviews with five high-ranking officials in the
Denver (and Colorado) juvenile justice systems; a half-dozen metro area, law enforcement officers;
two members of the Denver mayor's administration; three members of the Colorado Governor's
administration; two Denver gang intervention workers; and four state legislators. We occasionally
draw on these interviews to clarify and extend our interpretation of the print media's coverage of the
summer of violence.
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and prominent coverage to a particular issue. This was clearly the case in
Denver (and Colorado) during the summer of 1993, when both the print
and electronic media gave extensive coverage to the problem of juvenile
and violent crime.
Table One presents data generated from a content analysis of the
Denver Post (hereafter the Post), the newspaper with the largest circula-
tion in Denver and Colorado. These data indicate that, depending on the
particular indicator employed, juvenile and violent crime received from
two to over ten times more coverage in the Post during the 1993 summer
than in either the previous or subsequent summer. For example, with 196
stories on youth violent crime, the 1993 summer clearly outpaced both
the 1992 summer, during which 73 such articles were published, and the
1994 summer's publication of 61 stories. In addition, 44 front page sto-
ries on juvenile and violent crime were published during the summer of
1993, while in the summers of 1992 and 1994 only 2 and 6 such stories,
respectively, made the front page. Editorials about youth and violent
crime were also much more common during the 1993 summer; similarly,
the juvenile and violent crime articles printed in the 1993 summer were
more likely to be accompanied by photographs, and these photographs
were much more likely to appear on the front page.
20001
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TABLE 1 - NUMBER, PLACEMENT, AND LENGTH OF YOUTH AND
VIOLENT CRIME STORIES AND ACCOMPANYING PHOTOGRAPHS




Total stories 73 196 61
Front page stories 2 44 6
Section A stories 2 73 10
Editorial page stories 3 48 5
Length of all stories' 1512.65 5606.87 1615.98
PHOTOGRAPHS
Total photographs 29 106 32
Front page photographs 0 32 3
Length of all photographsb 177.89 1153 495.89
[Vol. 77:4
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The extensive news coverage of youth and violent crime in the
summer of 1993 was not due to a dramatic rise in the incidence of seri-
ous offenses. We consulted the official monthly reports of the Denver
metro area's two largest police departments (Denver and Aurora) that are
forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and summarized in its
annually published Crime in the United States: The Uniform Crime Re-
ports. We used these monthly reports to calculate the amount of violent
crime and the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses in these two
cities during the summer months of 1992, 1993, and 1994. The reports
disclose a small but unspectacular upturn in violence during the summer
of 1993. In the 1993 summer, Denver and Aurora police recorded two
more homicides than they did in the summer of 1992 and three more than
in the summer of 1994. The number of non-lethal, violent offenses (i.e.,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault) in the summer of 1993 were
approximately 3.5% higher than in the 1992 summer and roughly 5% to
10% higher than in the 1994 summer. It appears highly improbable,
however, that this modest increase in serious crime (including the slight
increment in homicides) during the 1993 summer can fully account for
the remarkable surge in media coverage which occurred that summer.
The available data on juvenile (which both Denver and Aurora po-
lice departments defines youth under 18-years-old) arrests belie the no-
tion that the metro area experienced an explosion of youth crime in the
1993 summer. The monthly reports indicate that 5 juveniles were ar-
rested by the two departments for homicide in the 1992 summer; 2 in the
1993 summer; and 1 in the 1994 summer. During the summer of 1992,
Denver and Aurora police arrested 128 juveniles for other serious, non-
lethal violent offenses; 159 juvenile arrests were made for these offenses
in the 1993 summer, while in 1994's summer 186 juveniles were arrested
for these crimes. This steady increase in juveniles arrested for serious,
non-lethal crimes coupled with the steady decline in juveniles appre-
hended for homocide over the three summers stands in stark contrast to
the undulating pattern of media coverage, with the relatively small num-
ber (and low priority) of news articles published in the summers of 1992
and 1994 interrupted by the dramatic spike of prominent juvenile crime
stories in 1993.
V. NARRATING THE SUMMER OF VIOLENCE
Like the sheer volume of salience of media coverage, the actual
content of reports written and broadcast during the 1993 summer height-
ened the visibility of juvenile violence. Journalists narrated an unfoldling
story, drawing meaningful, Gestalt-like links between what could easily
be construed as unrelated or merely coincidental crimes and articulating
general, overarching themes that attempted to make sense of the sum-
mer's violence. Four themes were central to the media's narration of the
summer of violence: innocent victims, unprecedented violence, en-
croaching violence, and random violence.
2000]
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Innocent victims. The perceived innocence of select victims injured
or killed by gun-toting assailants, many of them allegedly juveniles, was
the anchoring theme in the media's coverage. Seven high profile violent
crimes, which received front-page coverage immediately after they oc-
curred and, subsequently, were frequently mentioned, and briefly reca-
pitulated, in reporters', columnists', and editorial writers' summary char-
acterizations of the summer's violence, figured prominently in the elabo-
ration of this theme. In four of these incidents, children, ranging in age-
from ten-months to six-years, were victimized. In the other cases, four
"exemplary adults" were killed or seriously injured.
The Denver press presented these crimes in graphic detail, convey-
ing, to the extent that words, photographs and videotape can, their de-
structive immediacy. Reporters described how a woman stood by help-
lessly as her husband was murdered and moments later, after "falling to
her knees," suffered a "savage beating" that caused her head to swell to
twice its normal size.62 They described how a bullet struck a young boy in
the cheek and traveled to the back of his throat,6 ' and how a man, shot in
the side three times while driving home in the early morning hours, died
after his car stopped on a corner lawn. 64 Journalists offered their de-
scriptions of these crimes as eye-grabbing and gut-wrenching illustra-
tions of the problem of street crime.
The victims' cultural-moral status made the violence appear even
more ominous. Unequivocally innocent victims of street crime are rare.
Many victims contribute, unwittingly or not, to the sequence of events
that results in their injury or death, and they are not easily differentiated
from those who attack or kill them.6' Reporters are keenly attuned to
moral character, and estimates about a victim's moral standing figure into
their calculations about a crime's newsworthiness. In journalists' eyes, the
children and adults attacked in the high profile cases closely approxi-
mated the folk concept of the "ideal victim:" 66 these victims were inno-
cent not merely in a technical, legal sense, but in a morally and socio-
logically compelling sense. The media were particularly sympathetic to
the child victims, who they regarded as morally pure and whose victimi-
zation qualified as eminently newsworthy. As one reporter told us,
The children. That was why there was so much coverage [of
violent crime in the summer of 1993]. Little kids getting shot and
62. DENVER POST, July 24, 1993, at IA, 15A; DENVER POST, July 31, 1993, at 18A; ROCKY
MNT NEWS, July 24, 1993 at I A, 2A, 4A; ROCKY MNT NEWS, July 28, 1993 at 16A.
63. See Stacey Baca et al., 2 Tots Wounded, DENVER POST, July 28, 1993, at IA.
64. See Stacey Baca & Marilyn Robinson, Shots kill man driving in Park Hill, DENVER POST,
July 29, 1993, at IA.
65. NILS CHRISTIE, The Ideal Victim, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY:
REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-30 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed. 1986); David F. Luckenbill, Criminal
Homicide as a Situated Transaction, 25 SOC. PROBS. 176-186 (1977).
66. See Christie, supra note 65.
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killed. That put [violence] on an entirely different level. Innocent
blood. That's a tabloid statement, but it's true... Children and animals
are innocent. It brings outrage when this type of thing is done to in-
nocents.
Given the reigning Western conception of childhood, 67 the young
victims' moral innocence could simply be assumed, both by the press and
the public. The moral standing of the adult victims, however, could not
be taken for granted, and some interpretive work was required to affirm
these men's and women's innocence. Quoting liberally from testimonials
offered by these victims' families, friends, and colleagues, reporters con-
structed idealized mini-narratives attesting to these adults' exemplary
character. For example, neighbors described an adult victim "as 'easy-
going' and 'as nice as can be. ' 68 He volunteered as a Big Brother, and a
friend recollected an occasion when he "had taken one of his charges to
buy fishing equipment. The kid swiped some items. [The man] forced
him to go back into the store, return the stolen goods and apologize.
Then he bought the kid the stuff he stole., 69 His boss described him as "a
gentle guy who was very dependable and was the most likable cable
marketer he ever had. 70
The press used "typifying examples" to portray the high profile in-
cidents of violence.7' In fact, the victims described by the Denver media
were socially and demographically strikingly different from the majority
of those injured or killed in Colorado during the summer of 1993. Statis-
tically, the "average victim of youth violence" was "a Hispanic male,
17.7-years-old," who was also a gang member, "a high school drop out,
and [himself] a perpetuator of youth violence.7 2 The four child victims'
ethnicity and race -- three were Latino, the other African American --
were similar to the average victim (73% of those victimized by juvenile
violence were either Latino or African American), but the children dif-
fered markedly along nearly every other meaningful social attribute. The
four exemplary adults, who ranged in age from 27 to 43 and who were
all white, middle-class, college-educated, and residing in purportedly
"good" city neighborhoods or in "nice" metro-area suburbs, were also
starkly unrepresentative of those most likely to be victimized by street
67. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD (1984).
68. Lynn Bartels, Slaying shocks Park Hill: Residents say they realize they can't run from crime,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 30,1993, at 16A.
69. John C. Ensslin, Wife mourns 'best friend,' Park Hill man found slain also 'fishing
buddy,' she says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 31, 1993, at 5A.
70. Ed Morrow & Marilyn Robinson, Slaying Part of Violent Scene, DENVER POST, July 30,
1993, at IA.
71. See BEST, supra note 2, at 28-29 (describing how journalists start stories with examples to
define the problem of violent crime, draw the reader's attention, and "shape perceptions of the
problem").
72. Greg Lopez, Average victim leaving the cycle of gang violence, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Dec. 19, 1993, at 45A.
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violence. The media gave little attention to the statistically average vic-
tims, while granting exhaustive coverage to these ideal victims. Conse-
quently, despite their singular character, high profile incidents power-
fully shape the community's and official's "perceptions of the problem"
of youth violence.73
Unprecedented Violence. Though lacking corroborating statistical
data, the local media claimed that violence in Colorado was rising at an
alarming rate during the 1993 summer. In the place of credible numeric
evidence, journalists buttressed this claim by turning to presumably
knowledgeable public officials and, uncritically quoting and paraphras-
ing their remarks, passed off their rough approximations and instinctual
impressions as fact. In the wake of the first high profile crime which oc-
curred in early May, 1993, the Denver police chief, while conceding that
he did not have statistical proof, nonetheless told reporters that "he be-
lieves violence is on the rise in Denver .... ,,7' Drawing on interviews
with several officers and gang intervention workers, a front-page article,
entitled "Police: Violence escalating," asserted that the number of guns
possessed by juveniles, the number of drive-by shootings, and the num-
ber of gang members were all on the rise. 5
Reporters kept a running tabulation of the high profile cases, a form
of counting that, unlike a single summary statement of the crime rate,
justified meticulous accounts of each new incident. Explicitly connecting
each high profile event to the others, this running tab also implied that
they cohered into a meaningful pattern and that the summer's violence
represented something greater than the sum of its individual crimes. For
instance, an article reporting the shooting of a six-year-old began, "[y]et
another young child was fighting for his life last night .... 76 Similarly, a
story about the killing of an elementary school teacher opened with the
line, "[i]n what has become a deadly ritual in the metro area, yet another
",77innocent victim was fatally shot ....
Using disquieting imagery and analogies, reporters dramatized the
threat that violence posed to the city and state. For example, medical
personnel interviewed by the press analogized the city's and state's street
crime to international and civil wars. A Denver trauma surgeon com-
pared "the recent sharp increase in [violent] incidents" to "a battle zone,"
adding that, "'[t]his is like Korea . . .. , Other reports insinuated that
73. See Best, supra note 2, at 28-29.
74. Christopher Lopez, Mayor urged to organize a task force, DENVER POST, May 5, 1993, at IA.
75. See Marilyn Robinson. Police: Violence escalating, DENVER POST, June 11, 1993, at IA.
76. Steve Lipsher, Park Hill boy wounded in head, DENVER POST, June 10, 1993, at IA.
77. Marilyn Robinson & Tracy Seipel, Teacher, 27, slain driving in parking lot, DENVER POST,
Aug. 3, 1993, at IA.
78. Ann Schrader, Trauma surgeon finds himself in 'battle zone', DENVER POST, June 11,
1993, at IA.
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Denver was a city under siege. One of these articles appeared beneath the
heading, "City a hostage to violence?" '79 A full page editorial about Den-
ver's street violence was entitled, "Under Siege: Living with barbarians at
the gate." 80 Other journalists characterized the summer's violence with
such emotionally-charged images as "urban terrorism,"'" "a seemingly
endless, senseless plague of wanton violence,"82 and a "city ... teetering
on the edge of a murderous abyss."83
Characterizing the high profile victims not only as individuals but
also as symbols of community life, the press alluded to another dimen-
sion of the summer's ostensibly unprecedented violence. Durkheim's
classic analysis of Aboriginal totems and other religious objects notes
that they are "among the most preeminently sacred things," and, as a
result, are bound up with "the collective fate of the entire clan. '" 4 In the
summer of 1993, the local media transfigured the child and adult victims,
in their injuries and deaths, into emblems of Denver's and Colorado's
communal life. For instance, after applauding the "overwhelming" public
response to "the bounty fund" he had established to "persuade someone
to turn in the punks who shot a 6-year-old boy," a columnist explained
the child's totemic status:
You [those who contributed to the fund] understood that the
moment that bullet penetrated [the boy's] brain he became all of our
sons, all our children, brown and yellow, pink and red, rich and poor.
He was our hope for a better tomorrow, our dreams and our as-
pirations for a better world. And you understood we couldn't sit by
85
passively while the thugs stole that from us.
With the media spotlight brightly focused on the high profile cases,
reporters suggested that what distinguished the summer of violence was a
succession of assaults against cherished icons. The media intimated that
these desecrations constituted "a disaster, the greatest misfortune that can
befall a group., 86 Amplifying the language of communal crisis, disorder,
and dissolution, journalists conveyed the notion that transgressions
79. Lopez, supra note 74.
80. Clifford D. May, Under Seige: Living with barbarians at the gate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Aug. 8, 1993, at 86A.
81. Diane Carman, Urban terrorism requires more than just cops, prisons, DENVER POST, July 31,
1993, at IE.
82. Craig Bowman, Violence begins before the gun is ever drawn, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug.
12 1993, at 62A.
83. Ken Hamblin, Where are our leaders as Denver dies?, DENVER POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at 9B.
84. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMs OF REUGIOUS LIFE 118,120 (1995).
85. Ken Hamblin, Fund targets punks who shot Broderick Bell, DENVER POST, July 13, 1993, at
7B.
86. See DURKHEIM, supra note 84, at 120.
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against a community's quintessentially sacred objects represent, symboli-
cally, "a retrogression to chaos."87
Encroaching Violence. During the summer of 1993, news agencies
regularly remarked on the apparent movement of violence from the
"streets" to purportedly idyllic social space. The media frequently joined
this sense of encroaching violence to the distinction many make between
ostensibly "good" and "bad" parts of town, and the complementary ex-
pectation that serious, violent crime will be concentrated in a commu-
nity's less reputable areas. Journalists hold a similar folk concept, tend-
ing to regard as commonplace the violence that occurs in what is re-
garded as the socially disorganized inner-city. More novel and news-
worthy is the presence of street crime in presumably "nice" residential
neighborhoods or sacrosanct public space.
Reports elaborated the notion of violence invading safe, inviolate
space, suggesting that violent crime had escaped its traditional confines
and was erupting in urban enclaves and suburban areas that heretofore
had been relatively unscathed by street violence. A state legislator, re-
flecting on the summer's shootings, succinctly summarized this senti-
ment: "'I think we assumed for a long time that some neighborhoods are
safe and some aren't .... We can't assume that anymore."'88 This invidi-
ous differentiation of inner city and suburban space infused newspaper
and television coverage of several high profile cases. At the same time,
the more generalized motif of violence radiating from corrupt centers to
pristine peripheries appeared in stories decrying the spread of street vio-
lence from Denver to its suburbs and smaller cities throughout the state.
Press reports noted that drive-by shootings had occurred in Colorado
Springs, Durango, and Grand Junction. 9
The juxtaposition of encroaching violence with morally coded con-
ceptions of social space was reiterated in other ways. Several articles
deplored the spread of street violence to revered social institutions, in-
cluding churches and schools, once regarded as sanctuaries safely se-
questered from the tumult and dangers of the profane world. The Denver
zoo is not a sacred place, but its representational value as an emblem of
civic pride and its powerful association with family outings renders it a
potent symbol of public space. An editorial characterized the shooting of
an infant, who was sitting in front of the zoo's celebrated polar bear ex-
hibit, as a riveting reminder that no public or private space or institution
is inviolate:
87. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred And The Profane: The Nature Of Religion 47-48 (Willard R.
Trask trans., 1959).
88. Jennifer Gavin & Marilyn Robinson, Romer urges fast action by lawmakers to halt
violence, DENVER POST, July 28, 1993, at 13A.
89. Jennifer Gavin, Romer says not just guns on agenda, DENVER POST, June 23, 1993, at IA.
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[T]he bullet that sent the youngster to Denver General Hospital.
•. could serve as a metaphor for how violence robs this city's soul of
its collective peace. . . .No citizen is safe anywhere as long as a
predilection to violence remains prevalent. . . .Drive-by shootings
can happen anywhere an automobile can travel, and that includes any
street in the core -city or its suburbs. Gangs, drugs, and guns can infest
any school, whether it is located in the inner city or in an upscale en-
clave. The failure of the city, the state, and the nation to cope with
violence has come to haunt every comer of society -- even the polar
bear exhibit at the local zoo.90
Random Violence. Continually pointing to the seemingly unpredict-
able character of the seven high profile incidents, reporters suggested
that random violence threatened the entire community. Underscoring this
theme, one article observed, "[w]ith tiny children shot, men murdered,
women beaten and the specter of random violence taking center stage
this summer, Denver residents say they're wary but not terrified.' 9' Sev-
eral distinct meanings attached to the theme of random violence, but per-
haps the most salient was its unpredictable or patternless character, the
unnerving sense that "anyone could be the next victim. ' 92 A local talk-
radio host emphasized this element of random violence:
[the violence occurring in the summer of 1993] wasn't predictable. It
could happen anywhere for no apparent reason, all of a sudden, out of
the blue. People don't like that. If you've got a problem that people
can identify and isolate, then they can adjust to it. You can't adjust to
random violence.
The threat of random violence becomes psychologically salient only
when the perception that "anyone could be the next victim" is interpreted
as meaning "the next victim could be me or someone close about whom I
care." Personal identification with recent, actual victims of apparently
random violence fostered this heightened sense of vulnerability. The
print media suggested that many citizens identified strongly with one or
more of the victims described in the high profile cases. For example,
shortly after the shooting at the zoo, a reporter interviewed a 14-year-old
relaxing in City Park, which is immediately adjacent to the Denver Zoo.
The boy said, "[m]y mom's starting to worry about me. She's real hyper
about this, real hesitant since the gun shots. She says that little kid [who
was shot at the zoo] coulda [sic] been me." 93
Several of the journalists we interviewed remarked that the high
profile incidents supplied readers with abundant opportunities for intuit-
90. Zoo Shooting is tragic metaphor for violence, DENVER POST, May 4, 1993, at 6B.
91. Mark Eddy et a., Denver neighborhood abuzz with caution, but not terror, DENVER POST,
Aug. 1, 1993, at 4C.
92. Al Knight, First a diagnosis, then a cure, DENVER PoST, Aug. 8, 1993, at ID.
93. Kevin Simpson, A walk in the park: 'Put the angels around you and pray', DENVER POST,
May 6, 1993, at lB.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ing connections between themselves, or their immediate social circle,
and the victims. Proximity, whether calculated in terms of sheer physical
space or social networks, frequently elicits identification with a victim of
crime. As one reporter said, "[wihen it's somebody that your mother
knows or it's two blocks from your home and he got shot in your neigh-
borhood, suddenly it could be said, 'That could be me.'
Common social and demographic attributes, like age, class, ethnic-
ity, race, gender, and marital status, can spark a vivid recognition of the
self-in-the-other. The media portrayed the "savagely beaten" wife and
her murdered husband as a dynamic, popular, loving and handsome
young couple, recently married with a newly acquired apartment of their
own, and working hard to launch a successful business venture. They
embodied a social identity and trajectory which mirrored the aspirations
of many young adults in Colorado while eliciting the nodding approval
of older residents.
One can hypothesize that the print media's idealized representations
of victims resonated with the way many people like to think about them-
selves and encouraged members of the public to see a crucial similarity
between themselves and the high profile victims. The following conjec-
ture, ventured by a reporter, describes the folk reasoning that may have
connected readers to Ann Temple, the slain elementary school teacher:
[a] teacher, who is from [a small mountain town, roughly 75 miles
west of Denver], comes down to take a job in Denver. And it's her
dream to teach in the school and everything. And she is staying with a
girlfriend. She goes out to dinner and then drives to Safeway and gets
something. And some gang members scope her and kill her in a
parking lot as they try to rob her pocketbook. So here is another inno-
cent victim, like you and I, killed in quote our safe neighborhoods of
Denver. (Emphasis in original).
VI. BEYOND DELINQUENCY: ARTICULATING A NEW TYPE OF
TRANSGRESSING ADOLESCENT
The press's narration of the summer of violence identified the agents
and conditions allegedly responsible for "the mayhem," highlighting the
culpability of a purportedly new type of young lawbreaker. Relying
heavily on interviews with select state legislators, juvenile court judges,
public defenders, and district attorneys, the print media distinguished the
juveniles blamed for the summer's violence from conventional delin-
quents. In fact, the word "delinquent" rarely appeared in news reports. In
the over 500 youth and crime stories published by the Denver Post and
the Rocky Mountain News between May and mid-September 1993, the
terms delinquent and delinquency appear less than two dozen times.
When employed, these words were dubbed anachronisms. Reporters im-
plied that "delinquent" and "delinquency" conjured up forms of adoles-
cent transgression characteristic of an earlier, more innocent time. Play-
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ing cultural entrepreneur, reporters coined dozens of clever catchwords
to characterize the ostensibly new type of juvenile offender. They de-
scribed them as "criminal kids," "kid gangsters," "hard-core juvenile of-
fenders," "scary and dangerous youths," "young thugs preying on their
fellow citizens," "the state's nastiest young felons," "kids doing the
criminal work of adults," "greedy, self-serving, predatory street punks,"
"an infestation of teenage evil," and "tiny terrorists."
A rough sketch differentiating this hyper-threatening juvenile from
the traditional delinquent complemented the slogans. First, this invidious
comparison held that the new breed of youthful offender committed more
serious crimes and engaged in more chronic lawbreaking, whereas delin-
quents of the past engaged in more trivial acts of rebellion.
94
A second contrast underscored the youthful offenders' debased
moral character. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Denver
had been the site for a remarkably compassionate characterization of the
delinquent.9 Consistently affirming the delinquents' basic humanity and
fundamental child-like innocence, Judge Ben B. Lindsey, the leading
figure of the early Denver juvenile court, passionately proclaimed that
the sins of young lawbreakers paled in significance when compared to
the sins committed against them by negligent parents and/or a corrupt,
hypocritical social order. In the summer of 1993, the Denver media re-
pudiated this sympathetic conception of transgressing youth as senti-
mental, mushy-headed nostalgia. As an influential state representative
observed,
'[wie have a tendency to believe the Father Flanagan/Spencer Tracy
'Boys' Town' thing, that there's no such thing as a bad boy. But that's
a movie. Our reality today is that Spencer Tracy wasn't right.'
96
The governor's chief legal counsel added that "'really bad kids"' exist.
97
Lacking essential moral attitudes and emotions, these bad kids
struck journalists and public officials as not quite fully human. Denver's
chief juvenile court justice told a reporter, "'I see, in the youths who are
appearing in court, a lack of valuation of life, a lack of respect for life...
some scary, scary kids."'98 News articles reported that the contemporary
young offender is incapable of empathy or compassion. A former public
94. See Open up Juvenile Records, The Issue: The Arrest Records of Juveniles, Our view: It's
time they were opened to the public, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 4, 1993, at 32A.
95. Paul Colomy & Martin Kretzmann, Projects and Institution Building: Judge Ben B.
Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 42 SOC. PROBS. 191, 199 (1995).
96. Fred Brown, Majority favors banning guns from juveniles, DENVER POST, July 12, 1993,
at IA.
97. Clifford D. May, Kids and crime, What can special session do to solve Denver area's
dilemma?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 5, 1993, at 93A.
98. Jennifer Gavin, New breed of juveniles test legislative action, DENVER POST, Sept. I,
1993, at IF.
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defender observed that, "'[t]here is just a different attitude among the
kids now. It's not just that they have no social conscience. It's almost like
there is no morality. There is not any feeling toward other people."' 99
Third, the News and the Post reconceptualized the link between age
and crime. In the traditional conception of delinquency, age largely dic-
tated the meanings assigned to children's and adolescents' violations of
criminal law. This concept held that juveniles committed delinquencies
not crimes. In the 1993 summer, press stories and editorials reckoned
that by virtue of committing serious crimes, exuding contempt for human
life, and exhibiting not "one iota of emotion or remorse"'' ° for what they
have done, contemporary youth who are chronologically juveniles forfeit
any legitimate claim to be recognized and treated as such by the commu-
nity and courts. Attempting to articulate clearly the moment's sometimes
confusing sentiments, a district attorney proposed an alternative to the
relationship between age and law-breaking behavior posited by the tradi-
tional idea of delinquency: "'[1]et's differentiate juveniles on the basis of
their conduct, not [on] the basis of their age.'
Resonant cultural motifs buttressed the press's portrait of the youth-
ful offender. Accounts of the high profile cases, for instance, assigned
religious-like features to the juveniles suspected of injuring or killing the
"ideal" child and adult victims.
Durkheim argued that modern Western societies are permeated by a
"religion of humanity," which constitutes the "human person" as "sacred
in the ritual sense of the word," and imbues the individual in general with
"the transcendent majesty that churches of all time lend to their gods."'' 2
Partaking of the sacred, each person is entitled to a measure of respect,
dignity, and deference. This system of beliefs, like more orthodox forms
of religiosity, gravitates around two poles, the sacred and the anti-sacred,
with the latter viewed as "evil and impure powers, bringers of disorder,
causes of death and sickness, instigators of sacrilege."'03 In this quasi-
religious sense, Nils Christie contends that ideal victims and ideal of-
fenders constitute a compelling antinomy: "Ideal victims need-and cre-
ate-ideal offenders... The more ideal a victim is, the more ideal be-
comes the offender."'0 Ideal victims personify innocence, and so ideal
offenders embody evil; the ideal offender "is, morally speaking, black
99. DENVER POST, Sept. 9, 1993 at 7B.
100. Penelope Purdy, What makes a kid kill a cop in cold blood?, DENVER POST, Sept. 5, 1993,
at 3D.
101. Steve Lipsher, Romer shrugs off key rewrite, DENVER POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at IA.
102. Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals, in EMILE DURKHEIM: ON MORALITY
AND SOCIETY 46 (Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973).
103. DURKHEIM, supra note 84, at 412-414.
104. See CHRISTIE, supra note 65, at 25.
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against the white victim. ' 5 Ideal offenders are not integral members of
the community; they are outsiders, strangers, foreigners, aliens, intruders.
"The more foreign the better," according to Christie, who adds that the
ideal offender "is a dangerous man coming from far away."'06 Ideal of-
fenders, moreover, lack qualities essential for being regarded as fully
human: the ideal offender "is a human being close to not being one."1 °7
In addition to the symbolic contrast between ideal victims and ideal
offenders, another cultural theme infused the media's socio-moral profile
of these threatening. teens. There is abundant evidence suggesting that
"mainstream America," particularly white mainstream America, associ-
ates (and has long associated) African American and Latino male adoles-
cents and young adults with violence, danger, and disorder.1°8 There can
be little doubt that this association, powerfully reinforced by continuous
coverage of the high profile assaults on children and exemplary (white)
adults-attacks the media attributed explicitly and exclusively to young
Latinos and African American males-figured significantly in the crea-
tion of a more ominous category of transgressing adolescent. This asso-
ciation, it is reasonable to surmise, also served as a potent subtext for key
themes in the print media's account of the summer of violence, with the
themes of a unprecedented, encroaching and random violence animated
by the frightening imagery of African American and Latino youth
wrecking havoc on middle-class, Anglo lives and neighborhoods, and the
public space Anglos share with other groups.
Despite incorporating the symbolic opposition between the ideal
victim and the ideal offender and the widespread stereotype linking mi-
nority males to street crime, media accounts did not depict juvenile of-
fenders as unequivocal embodiments of evil. Rather, these accounts were
infused with considerable ambivalence: while an assuredly more forbid-
ding figure than the joyriding, hubcap stealing delinquent of yesteryear,
the contemporary young offender was not (yet) a "hardened adult crimi-
nal." Journalists, like the officials and experts they interviewed, were
unwilling to abandon completely the cultural precept that youthfulness
mitigates, to an extent, the culpability of young offenders. Nor were they
inclined to jettison entirely belief in the presumed malleability of youth,
a conviction which sustains hope that juvenile lawbreakers, even violent
ones, can be redeemed. The youthfulness of the new type of transgress-
ing adolescent did not prevent some columnists and reporters from lik-
ening violent juveniles to "bringers of disorder," but it also generated a
nearly equal number of columns and reports which counterbalanced this
105. Id at 26.
106. Id. at 26, 28.
107. Id at 26.
108. ELUAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
(1990); Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court Processing:
Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, 27 LAW & SOC. 285-311(1994).
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demonology by describing the conditions-largely of familial, social,
economic and moral breakdown-that purportedly propel "our young
people" to act "with so little regard for human life." As portrayed by the
local print media during the summer of violence, youthful offenders were
not, as a group, completely credible icons of "dangerous men coming
from far away."
VII. AFFIRMING THE MEDIA'S PRIMARY CLAIMSMAKING
By arguing that the local news media figured prominently in high-
lighting the problem of youth violence in Denver and Colorado during
the summer of 1993, we imply that news agencies are exceedingly influ-
ential claimants. There are important limits to the press' influence, how-
ever, and a comprehensive conception of the media as a claimant group
must consider how news organizations' claimsmaking diverges from the
stance other claimants typically take. First, when acting as a primary
claimsmaker, the media cannot long endure audience apathy. Fortified by
faith, moral conviction, and/or the more pedestrian pursuit of wealth,
prestige, authority and/or symbolic vindication, many conventional so-
cial problems entrepreneurs persist in advancing their claims despite
prolonged periods of public and policymaker indifference or disdain. The
media, by contrast, rarely demonstrate comparable tenacity (or hardhead-
edness). As profit-oriented enterprises whose revenues (particularly from
advertisers) depend on attracting consistently large audiences, '°9 the me-
dia are keenly attuned to the public's abbreviated "issue attention
cycle."" 0 In an important sense, as Anthony Downs and Marshall
McLuhan suggest, the public "'manages the news' by maintaining or
losing interest in a given subject."' And when "the media realize that
their emphasis" on a particular problem "is threatening many people and
boring even more, they will shift their focus to some 'new' problem."
'"2
Second, news organizations usually reject ownership of social
problems. While the media, like other primary claimants, attempt "to
influence the public definition of a problem,"'"3 they customarily eschew
exclusive control of an issue. They rarely insist on the right to offer a
definitive characterization of the undesirable condition in the same fash-
ion that nineteenth-century Protestant churches claimed ownership over
drunkenness ' 4 or contemporary medical research asserts its prerogative
in defining the nature of cancer. If they succeed in bringing visibility to a
troublesome social condition or practice, the media are predisposed to
109. See Gamson et al., supra note 60, at 375-380.
110. Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology -- The "Issue-Attention Cycle," 23 PUBLIC
INTEREST 38-50 (1972).
111. Id. at 42.
112. Id.at42.
113. See Gusfield, supra note 38, at 10.
114. Id. at 10-13.
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concede ownership to other claimsmakers, commonly exhibiting a pref-
erence for respected, legitimate institutions or their officers over insur-
gents, radicals, and outsiders.'15 The media's propensity to acknowledge
established institutions' authority to describe, explain, and interpret harm-
ful conditions falling within their respective domains does not preclude
the discriminating appraisal of statements and policies proffered by a
particular institutional spokesperson or representative. Still, these critical
assessments seldom prompt the media to question an institution's right to
own problems consistent with its "license and mandate."
' 16
Third, whereas other primary claimsmakers frequently aspire to
"effective control over social policy" '17 aimed at redressing a grievous
state of affairs, the media usually refuse "political responsibility" for the
deleterious conditions their coverage highlights."8 Instead of assuming
an obligation "to eradicate or alleviate the harmful situation," the media's
tack more commonly revolves around identifying "the responsible office
or person" and assigning that party the chore of doing something about
the problem, often using follow-up reports to hold the designated author-
ity accountable for fulfilling that charge."9 Practicing a "trickle-up prin-
ciple," journalists generally assign responsibility to individuals holding
high-ranking positions in the pertinent public or private institution, espe-
cially when a problematic incident is alleged to have occurred "during
their watch." 120
In the context of Denver's (and Colorado's) summer of violence,
these considerations raise a crucial question: how did the public and
policymakers respond to the media's coverage? Despite occasional dis-
sent, the response was overwhelmingly affirmative, with many citizens
and public officials alike treating the coverage as a more or less accurate
reflection of a serious social problem and insisting that "something must
be done" about the problem of youth violence. At the grass roots level,
for example, frightened citizens, anxious about their public safety, began
purchasing handguns and instruction in their use. 2 ' Others altered the
routes they drove to and from work; suspended their daily jog; mowed
their lawns in the early morning hours; refrained from sitting on the
porch after dark; installed bars across the windows of their homes; put
their young children to sleep in the bathtub to avoid stray bullets; im-
posed what their teenage children regarded as outrageously restrictive
115. See Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and
Unmaking of the New Left (1980).
116. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and their Work 78-87 (1958).
117. See Best, supra note 2, at 12.
118. See Gusfield, supra note 38, at 13-16.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Robert A. Stallings, Media Discourse and the Social Construction of Risk, 21 SOC. PROB.
90 (1990).
121. See Guy Kelly, Now, There's No Rest for the Wary Shootings Inject Fear Into the Hearts
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curfews; considered moving to safer locales; or took more precautions
about locking car doors and looking over their shoulders while walking
city streets."' And as "Coloradans [grew increasingly] fed up with gangs• • ,123
... [and] youth violence" , these matters also became, an issue in a bur-
geoning public debate, with many concerned citizens sending letters to
newspapers, calling local talk-radio programs, participating in town
meetings, organizing protest marches to decry the violence, and contact-
ing city and state officials, urging them to "do something" about the/1 124
problem. A Denver Post/[Television] News 4 poll revealed that adult
Coloradans supported the governor's call for a special legislative session
on youth violence by an overwhelming margin: almost four-to-one.
125
The pronouncements and activities of officials, community groups,
and opinion leaders also confirmed the essential thrust of Denver report-
ers' primary claimsmaking. All five candidates vying for a seat on the
Denver city council narrowed the focus of their debate to stopping gang
126and youth violence , while the Colorado legislature gave permission to
a special legislative committee to study youth violence in Colorado com-S • • 127
prehensively. On the eve of the Colorado General Assembly's special
session on youth violence, state and city luminaries in the business and
professional communities paid for and signed a full-page advertisement
that appeared in both the Rocky Mountain News"' and the Denver
Post. 129 The ad urged citizens to call their state representatives (and listed
several phone numbers where leading legislators could be contacted),
warning that it was "time to take action" against juvenile violence or "all
that will be left to do is take cover. '13 When President Bill Clinton
stopped briefly in Denver for a wilderness bill signing ceremony, the
122. See DENVER POST, July 29, 1993 at 9A; Aug. 1, 1993 at 4C; Aug. 4, 1993 at IA, 4A, 6A;
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20A.
123. John Sanko, Coloradans Fed Up With Gangs, Violence: Shootings of Tot at Zoo, 6-Year-
Old in N. Park Hill by Gang Members Pushed People Past Boiling Point, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
July 22, 1993 at 16A.
124. DENVER POST, June 15, 1993 at IA, 4A; June 17, 1993 at IA, 27A; Aug. 2, 1993 at IA;
Laurence Washington, About 200 Rally, March to Protest Gang Violence: A Generation is Being
Lost, Participant Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 17, 1993, at 5A; Lynn Bartels, Crowd Seeks
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mayor met with him and later told reporters, "I talked to him [President
Clinton] about the rash of violence we've had in Denver."'' A priest be-
gan fasting to spotlight youth violence, while the archbishop of Denver
called for an end to "the violence that has swept the area in recent
weeks."'33 The archbishop also promised to ask Pope John Paul II "to
address the issue during his visit here [Denver] next month [August]" to
celebrate World Youth Day. 34 And when the Pope, who had requested
and received "daily dispatches" from Denver,'35 delivered a speech" de-
plor[ing] America's urban violence," the Post commented, beneath the
front- and top-of-the-page headline-"Pope condemns violence"-that
"[tihe pontiff s remarks on violence hold particular meaning for Denver,
where random killings and assorted shootings in the past weeks have
prompted Gov. Roy Romer to convene a special legislative session next
month." 36
The deeply-felt urge to "do something" spawned dozens of propos-
als and programs aimed at reducing youth violence. Several Denver-area
teens formed a group, Helping Young People Educate (HYPE), to assist
adolescents and their families in coping with the threat of youth
violence. '1 A charismatic community activist and former gang member,
a city councilman, and several gang leaders attempted to negotiate a
truce between rival gangs, an effort they called Operation Reconstruc-
tion. '38 Metro-area educators took steps-e.g., closing off the streets bor-
dering a school during lunch periods to prevent drive-by shootings and
encouraging school administrators to accompany students as they go to
lunch off campus-to protect students from violent crime. 9 A 30-
member committee, appointed by the Denver Mayor and the Denver City
Council President, was asked to devise a plan to combat youth
violence.' 4° District attorneys representing Denver and seven nearby
counties announced plans to "make violent crimes involving weapons
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132. Ed Morrow, Priest fasts to spotlight youth violence, DENVER POST, July 13, 1993 at 3B.
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1993 at IA.
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'our highest priority.'" 14 1 United States Representative Bill Armstrong
(from Colorado) argued that fighting juvenile and gang violence would
require more money to hire additional police officers. Representative
Pat Schroeder (also from Colorado) sought $4.4 million from Congress
to fund a military-style program aimed at "reclaim[ing] America's
youth." 
43
The Denver Mayor and the Colorado Governor, more so than any
other social problem entrepreneurs, made the most effective claims to
ownership and responsibility for the problem of youth violence. At a
press conference, Mayor Webb outlined his own 6-point plan, heavy on
increased law enforcement, to combat gang violence.'" The mayor also
anted up $1.1 million to fund special police impact units.1
45
The governor's plan was even more ambitious. Governor Romer
advanced a 14-point strategy to curtail violent youth crime. 46 Character-
izing his plan as "an 'iron fist' against outlaw gangs and a 'helping hand'
for Coloradans fighting to take back their neighborhoods," the governor
urged swift prosecution of gangs and of youth charged with violent of-
fenses, targeted juveniles with guns, and proposed building the youthful
offender system while also expanding juvenile detention facilities. 147 He
also liberally dispensed no-nonsense rhetoric, including a classic, line-in-
the-sand ultimatum to gang members: "Get out, or we'll break you.
Colorado's not going to become another Los Angeles."' 48 Through tire-
less lobbying of a wide array of constituencies, the governor eventually
succeeded in mobilizing elite and popular support for the special session
he said was necessary to enact his plan.
149
The net and mutually reinforcing effect of these sometimes diver-
gent reactions, which themselves were circulated back into the media's
unfolding narrative about the summer of violence, was to magnify the
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visibility of youth violence and reaffirm the perception that it represented
a vitally serious public problem requiring immediate action. This widely
supported perception established a new environment of action where
policy and legislative initiatives that were rejected or nearly inconceiv-
able only four months earlier could now enjoy a broad base of support.
This media-spawned and socially affirmed construction of reality did not
dictate a specific plan of action, but it strongly loaded the dice in favor of
proposals promising a forceful, official response to the problem of youth
violence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Denver media's prominent and continuous news coverage of
youth violence (in the summer of 1993) occurred toward the end of a
nearly ten year period that had witnessed a sharp increase in serious ju-
venile violence across the country. Data from the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's Crime in the United States: The Uniform Crime Reports and
the Supplemental Homicide Report indicate that between 1985 and 1994
the nation saw "a significant decline in homicides committed by older
offenders" and a dramatic rise in "homicides committed by younger of-
fenders, ""5 with "the rate of murder committed by teens ages 14 to 17
more than doubl[ing]... from 7.0 to 19.1 per 100,000.''. This pattern of
rising lethal juvenile violence arrived in Denver and Colorado in 1988,
three years after it commenced elsewhere, and continued through 1995,
though this surge in serious youth crime was not nearly as pronounced in
Denver as it was in larger metropolitan areas (e.g., Los Angeles, New
York, and Chicago). 
152
But it is a mistake to presume that these rising rates of lethal juve-
nile violence, by themselves, made juvenile violence a visible social
problem. As social constructionists contend, there are innumerable in-
stances of rising rates of harmful conduct that go virtually unnoticed.
There are, in addition, countless ways in which statistical data can be
interpreted and even explained away. In the context of the summer of
violence, for example, we have noted that the heightened media coverage
of serious juvenile crime did not reflect an upsurge in the actual amount
of violence. Furthermore, in their interviews with us and in published
accounts, several reporters conceded their uncertainty about whether the
overall incidence of juvenile violent crime during the 1993 summer was
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higher or lower than it had been in previous summers. ' And Governor
Romer, the public official who took the lead in mobilizing support for
the special session and in securing passage of the session's most signifi-
cant legislation, offered this telling observation some five years after the
summer of violence: "'If you were here that summer, everyone in this
community was upset. We didn't read statistics, we read every event, and
they were dramatic. It was a dramatic summer.'
There is, moreover, little indication that the official recognition of
youth violence was the product of a cumulative effect, with citizens and
officials beleaguered year after year by mounting rates of juvenile vio-
lence finally conceding that a genuine problem existed. In fact, residents
in Denver neighborhoods where street violence is most heavily concen-
trated had complained for years, but these complaints were largely dis-
counted by public officials and were rarely heard or heeded by residents
living in other areas of the city and state. The official recognition of
youth violence in Denver and Colorado hinged on an unlikely series of
atypical crimes: the accidental woundings of four young children and
the murder and assaults of four exemplary adults. These highly improb-
able (and hence newsworthy) events focused the media spotlight on
youth violence and propelled this issue to the forefront of the policy
agenda.
The visibility of a social problem, in other words, in not a simple
function of its frequency or its objective harmfulness (however that
might be calculated). Rather, the process of making a problem visible
must be treated as a social phenomenon in its own right. The visibility of
youth violence in Denver and Colorado was largely contingent on the
claimsmaking efforts of the news media. By providing continuous and
prominent coverage of youth violence, by articulating a dramatic narra-
tive that proved compelling to citizens and officials alike, and by sharply
differentiating an ostensibly new type of transgressing adolescent from
the traditional delinquent, this powerful claimant group succeeded in
bringing enormous visibility to a problem in a way that mere references
to rising rates of offending never could.
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